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Liberalism Versus Democracy? Schooling
Private Citizens in the Public Square
MEIRA LEVINSON*
Thisarticleexaminestheconﬂictinpoliticalliberalismbetweenthedemandsplacedoneducation
by liberalism and those placed on education by democracy. In so far as the principles of political
liberalism entail both that the state not interfere with individuals’ private commitments and that
it ensure the maintenance of liberal democratic institutions, I suggest that it is rent by an internal
tension that poses particular dilemmas for education. This tension is explored through three
competing models of the school as a politically liberal institution, expressed in terms of a
schematic analysis of three countries’ approach to education: England, the United States and
France. I argue that while all three countries capture important aspects of the politically liberal
educational project, and while the American approach especially successfully and self-
consciously addresses the balance between liberalism and democracy in constructing the school
as a public square, no model in theory or in practice is able to meet the diverse and competing
demands of political liberalism. In so far as any political system is viable only if it is able to
maintain itself across generations, however, I conclude that political liberalism fails as a theory
in at least one important respect, and that the problem of education thus deserves much deeper
attention from liberal political theorists than it has yet enjoyed.
In this article, I examine potential conﬂicts in political liberalism between the
demands placed on education by liberalism and those placed on education by
democracy. In so far as the principles of political liberalism entail the
maintenance of liberal democratic institutions, it is rent by an internal tension
that poses particular dilemmas for education. Theliberal dimension of political
liberalism privileges the private component of individuals’ lives, attempting to
shield individuals as much as possible from interference by the state,
government or other secondary associations. As a result, this liberal dimension
both favours a strong public–private distinction, and attempts to place as much
of people’s lives as possible in the private domain so as to protect them from
public interference. The political or democratic dimension of political
liberalism, by contrast, is concerned with the public character of individuals’
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lives, as well as with individuals’ obligations to preserve the institutions of
publiclife.Recognizingthemaintenanceofliberaldemocraticinstitutionstobe
an essential prerequisite for the maintenance of political liberalism itself, the
democratic element of political liberalism ﬁnds expression in its insistence that
citizens come to identify with the political community and learn and
demonstratethecivicvirtuesoftoleration,mutualrespectandcriticalreﬂection
concerning the demands of public life.
It is the difﬁculties caused by attempting to accommodate this tension
between liberalism and democracy in schools – and by extension, in society at
large – that will be the focus of this article. The public–private distinction has
admittedly been attacked already from numerous angles, and writers such as
Amy Gutmann, Nomi Maya Stolzenberg and Stephen Macedo have discussed
the problem speciﬁcally in regard to education.
1 Important institutional
conundraraisedbythistensionhavebeenignored,however,intheattentionpaid
to theory independent of speciﬁc educational practice. In particular, I believe
it is worth exploring how school provision might actually be structured so as
to minimize the tension between the principles of private non-interference on
the one hand and public ‘character-building’ on the other. To this end, I will
examineboththepotentialcurriculardemandsimposedbypoliticalliberalism,
and the institutional demands of structuring school provision so as to meet the
democratic and liberal requirements of a plural society.
In exploring the possibilities of public school
2 provision for the private
individual, I will present three competing visions of the school as a politically
liberal institution, expressed in terms of a schematic representation of three
countries’approachtoeducation:England,theUnitedStatesandFrance.
3These
competing structures of education, I will argue, reﬂect important differences of
commitment to, and can proﬁtably be distinguished on the basis of the relative
weight given to, liberalism and democracy. If we think of these two elements
as deﬁning the endpoints of a politically liberal spectrum, England’s approach
to school provision will be represented as lying very near the public–private
divide(andthereforerelativelyfarfromconcernsaboutinculcatingcivicvirtue),
1 AmyGutmann,‘CivicEducationandSocialDiversity’,Ethics,105(1995),557–79;NomiMaya
Stolzenberg, ‘ “He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out”: Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox
ofaLiberalEducation’,HarvardLawReview,106(1993),581–667;StephenMacedo,‘LiberalCivic
Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls?’ Ethics, 105 (1995),
468–96.
2 In the interests of emphasizing the role of the state school in establishing and maintaining the
‘public square’ and the public liberal democratic virtues, I choose to use the American term ‘public’
school in place of the British ‘state’ school to designate state-maintained schools.
3 It is a bit misleading to refer to American school provision in national terms, as education is
governed (and provided) almost entirely at the state level. Because the features of school provision
that I want to examine, however, are fairly uniform across the country – both because constitutional
restrictions such as the First Amendment place limits upon public school policy, and because larger
states exercise signiﬁcant indirect power over smaller states’ education policy (through textbook
selection, for example) – I will speak in this article as if the United States has an identiﬁable national
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with France at the other extreme, and the United States positioned somewhere
in the middle.
Thedivisionbetweenthedemandsofthepoliticalandtheprivatewillbeseen
to be linked to a second divide among political liberals – namely, the place of
pluralism in public life (and therefore also in the life of the public school). In
tandem with its privileging of the private over the public, England will be seen
to pursue a policy of ‘divided pluralism’, in which pluralism is treated as a
condition of private life to which public life and schooling must conform, but
not as itself a public good. The United States, by contrast, will be seen to
embrace individual pluralism as an intrinsic – and intrinsically desirable –
feature of public life; France, under this analysis, will be seen to link its
republican emphasis on the inculcation of a single national character to an
explicit disavowal of pluralism as a public good. Thus, the article will follow
through both sources of tension – the balance between private non-interference
and public civic education, and the place of pluralism in a liberal society – in
its attempt to set forth the institutional possibilities and practical conﬂicts latent
within politically liberal education.
By focusing on the speciﬁc systems of educational provision represented by
these three countries (as opposed to conﬁning the analysis to a purely abstract
level), I hope that we will come to understand better the possibilities and
limitations of political liberalism in the civic and educational spheres.
Theorizingabouteducationconductedwithoutreferencetospeciﬁcexperiences
of educational practice is problematic for two reasons. First, the nuances
characteristic of relationships among ideas, practices, principles, etc., are often
lostwhentheyareconsideredinpurelytheoreticalcontexts.Empiricalstudycan
reveal tensions and subtleties of inﬂuence among ideas and practices that seem
straightforward and unproblematic at the level of abstract theory. Secondly,
reference to experience is useful because of the special link between the
construction of national identity and the construction of education and the
school. As I will try to demonstrate throughout the article, education cannot be
abstracted from its national and local context. Working through politically and
legislatively located empirical examples of educational institutions and
approaches is thus the best means of coming to understand even in theory what
a politically liberal education can achieve. Although there is no room to give
further justiﬁcation here, I hope that the article will itself provide a
demonstration of this methodological assertion.
I should note, however, that theoretical rather than empirical questions
ultimately drive this article, and thus direct the use to which the empirical
material is put. In particular, I do not mean to claim that English, French or
American education policies are or ever have been motivated by politically
liberalconcerns,northatmycharacterizationsofthepossibleoutcomesofthese
policies always occur in practice. Rather, the descriptions that follow are
intentionally simpliﬁed and schematized ‘ideal-type’ models of what are in
practice extraordinarily complex sets of pragmatically institutional aims,
motivations and practices. This is especially true in so far as these models are336 LEVINSON
limited to each country’s public education policies. Private schools occupy a
surprisingly privileged place in all three countries – France’s funding of private
Roman Catholic schools in spite of its ﬁerce attachment to secular education
being the most noteworthy example. Private schools thus end up playing a role
inthesocietythatcanbesharplydivergentfromthestate’sprimaryeducational
stance.
4 Although the exclusion of private schooling from this discussion
obviously reduces this article’s descriptive validity and effectiveness as an
empirical analysis of comparative educational practices, its omission is
warranted, I believe, by considerations both of space and of theoretical clarity.
In the end, while I do hope that the theoretical discussion will prove at least
somewhat empirically illuminating, any insight gained into current education
practice is welcome but secondary.
I. PRIVATIZING THE PUBLIC: THE ENGLISH MODEL
Political liberalism’s ‘claim to fame’ is that it avowedly makes minimal
demands on individual citizens, especially in the private arena of personal
commitments. Citizens must exhibit such traits of character as will uphold and
maintain the institutions of liberal democracy, and they must respect the rights
and liberties of others. But they need not afﬁrm any state-wide conception of
what deﬁnes the good life or the good person. In so far as liberals measure
legitimacy by the range of people who could reasonably support a particular set
of political principles (under a variety of more and less artiﬁcial conditions),
political liberalism’s undemandingness, and careful protection of individuals’
private lives from public intrusion, is what sets it apart as a desirable and viable
political theory in the eyes of many theorists.
5 Extending this approach to the
questionofeducation,then,thischaracterizationofpoliticalliberalismsuggests
that any publicly provided (or mandated) schooling should respect the private
4 French and American policies in particular towards private schools are both historically and
normatively at odds with their public educational commitments. It is only because on 24 June 1984
one million people marched in Paris against the suggested closure of Catholic schools, that they still
exist at all; likewise, it is because public schools in the United States were anti-Catholic from their
foundation until the middle of this century (and thus violated their self-professed neutralist
commitments) that the private and parochial school movement took hold in America. In neither case
doesthepositionofprivateschoolsreﬂectoradvanceeachcountry’spubliceducationalaims,despite
their giving dissenting families a private educational outlet. It does not make sense, therefore, to try
to integrate public and private education policies into a single, coherent model, because no such
coherent, principled stance exists. (England’s sympathetic attitude towards private schooling, by
contrast, is completely consistent with its approach to public education, as Section I will show.)
5 In this sense political liberalism is often contrasted with comprehensive liberalism – i.e.,
liberalismstemmingfromacommitmenttoautonomyorothercomprehensiveconceptionofthegood
life – which theorists such as Rawls and Macedo argue cannot reasonably secure the support (even
hypothetically)ofallmembersofsociety.Itisintermsofthiscontrastthatpoliticalliberalismshould
be understood in this article. I have intentionally not grounded it in a more speciﬁc theoretical
frameworkorauthor(suchasRawls’sPoliticalLiberalism)becauseitispoliticalliberalism’sgeneral
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lives of children and families by leaving their private lives and commitments
essentially untouched – or at least unchallenged – if possible. Education in the
democraticvirtueswould,underthisanalysis,ideallytakeplacewithinacontext
that respected or even afﬁrmed children’s private commitments (assuming that
the afﬁrmation of one set of commitments did not interfere with those held by
other children).
This weighting of the private versus the public suggests that the philosophy
of school provision exempliﬁed by England might best satisfy the demands of
politicalliberalism.
6UndertheEnglishmodel,familiesare(intheory)permitted
to separate themselves into more-or-less homogeneous groups based on
commoninterestsandcommitments.Thestatethenpartiallyfunds(‘maintains’)
schools that cater to these private interests.
7 According to the 1985 ‘Swann
Report’ delivered by the state-sponsored Committee of Inquiry into the
Education of Children from Ethnic Minority Groups:
The right of ethnic minority communities to seek to establish their own voluntary
aidedschoolsisﬁrmlyenshrinedinlaw.Undertheprovisionsofthe1944Education
Act ethnic minority communities, along with any other group of individuals, are
entitledtomakeproposalsfortheestablishmentofavoluntaryaidedschooltocater
for their children’s educational needs.8
If we consider religion, for example, we see that in England today, the state
supports voluntary Anglican, Catholic, Methodist and Jewish schools, and may
eventually approve assisted or grant-maintained Muslim schools as well.
9
Althoughtheseschoolsmaynotdiscriminateamongprospectivestudentsonthe
basis of ability, they can discriminate on the basis of religion;
10 thus, a
publicly-maintained Catholic school, for instance, can refuse entrance to all
non-Catholic children. In practice only 32 per cent of English state schools are
church-afﬁliated,
11andevenmanyofthosedisplayminimalorlimitedreligious
adherence. In theory, however, this model (and English law) permit the public
6 This model of schooling also seems to be most like that for which William Galston calls. See
William Galston, Liberal Purposes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 241–56.
7 Financing and governance of religious schools, for example, is somewhat complicated;
depending on the extent of church contribution to the maintenance of the school, the governing body
is either church-dominated or state-dominated, and curriculum decisions are concomitantly more or
less church inﬂuenced. See Education Act 1944 (London: HMSO) and Education Reform Act 1988
(London: HMSO).
8 Lord Swann, Education for All (London: HMSO, 1985), p. 499.
9 The fate of Muslim schooling in England is a complex one that itself symbolizes many of the
conﬂictingpullswithinliberalismdiscussedinthisarticle.Inalongerarticle,itwouldbeilluminating
to discuss Muslim schools’ supposed violation of the principles of equal and democratic education,
andtheimplicationsofthisjudgementfortheplaceofMuslimfamiliesandcitizenswithintheliberal
polity in general.
10 SeeEducationReformAct1988,Section30,subsection(3):‘Alocaleducationauthorityshall,
ifsorequestedbythegovernorsofanaidedorspecialagreementschoolmaintainedbytheauthority,
make arrangements with the governors in respect of the admission of pupils to the school for
preserving the character of the school.’
11 DepartmentforEducation,StatisticsofEducation:Schools(London:HMSO,1993),pp.140–2.338 LEVINSON
school essentially to accommodate itself to private commitments, functioning
almost as an extension of the child’s private upbringing as opposed to
establishingarigidlydifferentiatedpublicspaceorinstitution.Thestatesatisﬁes
the public as a whole by providing ‘something for everyone’ in the form of a
compilation of state-funded private spaces. But, at least in theory, no single
school need encapsulate the entire ‘body public’.
12
Nor is religion the only axis along which families may separate themselves
within the state school system in order to form the equivalent of ‘independent
stateschools’,
13asformerPrimeMinisterMargaretThatcherapprovinglyterms
them.Sincetheestablishmentofnumerousparentalchoiceschemesinthe1980
and 1988 Education Acts, parents and children can ‘privatize’ public education
to meet their particular needs and commitments in a number of ways. The most
obvious of these is the Assisted Places Scheme, established by the 1980
Education Act,
14 which explicitly provides money for deserving students to
attend private schools. State ﬁnancing of private as opposed to public schools
may be the logical response to liberalism’s call for state non-interference with
individuals – but it remains to be seen whether such action is compatible with
asimilarmaintenanceofdemocracy.Evenwithinthecontextofpublicschools,
‘open enrolment’ and parental choice rights detailed under the 1994 ‘Parents’
Charter’ provide extensive opportunities for parents and children to segregate
themselves into schools that reﬂect their particular commitments or associa-
tions. For instance, every school must publish an annual prospectus that details
not only examination and attendance statistics, but also ‘the aims and values of
the school and its approach to teaching’ and ‘how they provide moral and
spiritual guidance for their pupils’.
15 Parents are encouraged to use these
statements of purpose in order to choose a school for their child – and thus to
ensurethattheirchildrenareeducatedinaschoolwhoseethosexplicitlyfavours
the particular commitments and values held by the family.
16
In addition, class differentiation and segregation has re-emerged in some
public schools as a result of parents’ increased powers to choose. Popular
schools with more requests than places can decide which students to take in a
process that The Economist acknowledges often leads to ‘pupils being
“selected” by schools (offspring of the middle-classes preferred), rather than
12 Again, I do not mean to suggest that all (or even a majority of) English schools ﬁt this model
in practice, nor that English society is as radically divided as this description might imply. As I
explained above, what is of signiﬁcance in this article is not the empirical outcome of these models
of schooling, but their theoretical limits; i.e. English education is structured so as to permit the
effective privatization of nominally public schools, and thus also to permit the establishment of the
divided pluralism I will describe below.
13 Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: Harper Collins, 1993), p. 570.
14 Education Act 1980 (London: HMSO), sec. 17.
15 DepartmentforEducation,OurChildren’sEducation:TheUpdatedParent’sCharter(London:
HMSO, 1994), p. 7.
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vice versa’.
17 Furthermore, some schools have reintroduced selective examina-
tions – examinations which, again, have been criticized as a short-hand method
ofreintroducingclass-basedsegregationwithinsupposedlypublicschools.
18In
sum, the English model of school provision permits parents and children
considerable latitude in separating themselves from other students who are
‘different’ (be it on religious, moral, intellectual or class-based grounds), and
therebyallowsthem,too,toshapethepublicschooltoreﬂectandreinforcetheir
private aims and values. In this respect, at least, the ‘privatization’ of the public
school in the English model seems well on its way.
Unlike truly private schools, of course, even voluntary (denominational),
grant-maintained and specialized public schools are required to teach the
National Curriculum – a comprehensive syllabus for 5–16 year-olds that is
ostensibly intended to take up 70–80 per cent of school time.
19 The National
Curriculum thus might be seen as a unifying public force among an otherwise
divided school system. It is notable, however, that the presumptively most
public element of the curriculum – Education for Citizenship – is not included
inthelistoftheten‘foundation’subjectsinwhichstudentsareformallyassessed
for competency and achievement. Rather, as one of a group of subjects
designated to be ‘cross-curricular themes’ (the others being health education,
economic and industrial understanding, careers’ education and guidance, and
environmental education), citizenship is designed to be taught only within the
context of the other disciplines.
20 It is not thought to warrant a class on its own.
Nor are teachers or students given much guidance as to what citizenship (or
citizenship education) is meant to entail. In contrast to the massive government
publications that detail with exquisite precision every dimension of the
foundation subjects, the National Curriculum Council has published a single
workbook about citizenship education, and provides no standards for assessing
17 ‘Parent Power’, The Economist, 25 March 1995, p. 17.
18 Disillusion with the class-based homogeneity of selective grammar schools was one of the
primary reasons for Labour’s introduction of non-selective ‘comprehensive’ schools in the 1960s.
As the 1967 Plowden Report made clear, ‘Selection for secondary education … has been criticized
as being socially divisive both because it gives middle class children a better chance than manual
workers’ children to secure grammar school places, and because it gives better career openings to
grammar school than to modern school pupils. The same arguments are also used against selection
forprimaryschoolclasses,orstreaming.’(CentralAdvisoryCommitteeforEducation,Childrenand
their Primary Schools (Plowden Report) (London: HMSO, 1967), p. 288, paragraph 809.) See also
Department of Education and Science, The Organization of Secondary Education, Circular 10/65
(London: HMSO, 1965); J. Stuart Maclure, Educational Documents (London: Methuen, 1973);
David Rubinstein and Brian Simon, The Evolution of the Comprehensive School 1926–1966
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969); Clyde Chitty, Towards a New Education System: The
Victory of the New Right? (London: Falmer Press, 1989).
19 Ron Dearing, The National Curriculum and Its Assessment: Final Report (London: School
Curriculum and Assessment Authority, 1994), paragraphs 2.2, 3.24, 4.28–29; Thatcher, Downing
Street Years, p. 594.
20 For more on the structure of the National Curriculum, see Jim Sweetman, Curriculum
Conﬁdential Two: The Complete Guide to the National Curriculum (Tamworth, Staffs.: Bracken
Press, 1992).340 LEVINSON
students’progress.
21Whilethetheorybehindthisdivisionbetween‘foundation
subjects’ and ‘cross-curricular themes’ may (or may not) be sound, in practice
it leads to the marginalization and effective exclusion of citizenship education
from the public school classroom. Thus, I suggest that not even the National
Curriculum succeeds in reinstating the body public within the potentially
divided and privatized space of the publicly maintained school.
22
ThisanalysisoftheEnglishmodelofschoolprovisionalsorevealsthesource
of my claim that such a system may foster (or arise from) ‘divided pluralism’
– i.e., a pluralistic national community composed of a number of mutually
uninterested mono-religious, mono-cultural, mono-linguistic or mono-
economic subcommunities. By providing schools that reinforce families’
private values and experiences, the state helps to perpetuate a polity that is
composed of a number of separate, thriving cultures. In a sense, therefore, such
a system fosters a multicultural national society. Multiculuralism itself,
however, is not treated as a public good; in an important sense, pluralism is
merely an accidental public by-product of a private-regarding school system.
Nor does pluralism necessarily become part of public culture or the public
identity of citizens and the state, since future citizens (i.e., children) are not
necessarily encouraged in school to embrace or even experience communities
and values other than their own. This is not to say that the National Curriculum
Council does not pay lip-service to the demands of multiculturalism. As one of
thetwo‘dimensions’ofcross-curriculareducation,multiculturalismiscredited
with being at the core of a successful curriculum. ‘A commitment to providing
equal opportunities for all pupils, and a recognition that preparation for life in
a multicultural society is relevant to all pupils, should permeate every aspect of
thecurriculum.’
23Thiswrittenacknowledgementofmulticulturalism’simport-
ance, however, is as far as the National Curriculum Council and the state go in
actually establishing education for a multicultural society.
21 What little guidance is given is to be found in the National Curriculum Council’s Education
for Citizenship: Curriculum Guidance 8 (London: National Curriculum Council, 1990).
22 It is possible, of course, to integrate citizenship education into the curriculum under a different
name – through history and literature classes, social studies, and so forth. While some of this might
go on in the National Curriculum as it stands, I suggest that for three reasons, it still does not satisfy
the demands of civics education. First, students in English schools do not learn about the
parliamentary system, the structures of state and local government, the passage of a bill through
Parliament, etc., unless they speciﬁcally take an A-level course in British politics. This seems an
unacceptable lacuna in any curriculum that is meant to restore public character to and inculcate civic
virtues within an otherwise (potentially) privatized school system. Secondly and relatedly, civic
concerns have thus far been addressed in the National Curriculum foundation subjects only within
the history curriculum – a practice that may engineer the illusion of a common past, but which does
not succeed in building a conception among students of a shared, public present or future. Finally,
in so far as the National Curriculum itself provides for citizenship education as a separate, albeit
cross-curricular, ‘theme’, the criticisms above of its (lack of) inclusion in the curriculum continue
to hold true.
23 NationalCurriculumCouncil,CurriculumGuidance3(London:NationalCurriculumCouncil,
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While the English model of schooling admirably fulﬁls political liberalism’s
promise to leave citizens alone to pursue their own private conceptions of the
good, it seems less successful in inculcating the public virtues needed for the
maintenance of a liberal democracy. The nearly total weight placed on liberty
(andthepublic–privatedistinction)asopposedtodemocracy(andeducationfor
citizenship) leaves this model of school provision open to challenges from
within political liberalism itself. Four objections to the English model present
themselves. First, it can be argued that students cannot learn to be tolerant and
mutually respectful of other people, traditions and ways of life unless they
are actually exposed to them. It is not enough to talk about tolerating
others within the safety of mutually reinforcing, homogeneous groups as the
English approach allows; toleration can be acquired only by interacting with
others in a mutually respectful but challenging, heterogeneous setting. This is
an empirical claim about both psychology and pedagogy that itself requires
further justiﬁcation in order to be fully compelling; it does serve to cast some
initial doubt, however, on the ability of schools as described above to provide
the type of democratic education required for political liberalism to succeed.
24
Secondly, the English model neglects the nature of toleration within a liberal
democracy. In order to be tolerant, political liberals generally agree, it is
necessary that we possess some measure of detachment from our own personal
commitments. We can accept other people’s conceptions of the good as
reasonable – and therefore as worthy of respect and toleration – only if we are
able to see our own commitments as in some way contingent. This sense of
contingencydemandsinturnalevelofintellectual,ifnotemotional,detachment
from our own conceptions of the good. The appropriate sense of detachment,
however,cannotbeadequatelyfosteredinaschoolthatispurpose-builttoreﬂect
the personal aims and conceptions of the good of children and their families (as
theEnglishmodelis).Amoreseparate,publicspacemustbeestablishedinstead,
onewhichprovidesanenvironmentdistancedfromthecommitmentspromoted
by children’s home communities and families. Only in this way can toleration
actually be achieved, because only in such a setting can children come to
recognize the contingency of their own attachments.
Thirdly, I suggest that further implications follow from this vision of the
school as a public space that must be explicitly constructed and differentiated
from the private spaces of children’s everyday lives. Because of the radical
24 It might be argued that such interactions can and do take place outside the school – in the
neighbourhood, or in mandatory national service programmes evident in countries like Israel and
Switzerland – and thus that it is unnecessary for the school in particular to take responsibility for
establishing a heterogeneous setting in which children are intentionally exposed to difference and
taught to be tolerant. While it is true that schools are not the only social institutions to teach
toleration and expose children to diversity, they none the less strike me as being one of the most
important. Not only are they under direct state control – and can therefore explicitly adopt the aims
of political liberalism as their own – but they also reach children when they are very young, as
national service programmes, integrated workplaces and other institutions do not. Although this is
not an analytic argument, I would suggest on pragmatic grounds at least that schools must play a
central role in teaching toleration and bringing different groups together in one place.342 LEVINSON
pluralism that characterizes modern society, a necessary condition of indi-
viduals’ becoming a ‘people’ or ‘public’ is that they be able to identify – and
to identify with – a shared, communal space or institution. It is out of the
commoncommitmenttothevisible,evenphysical,institutionsofpubliclifethat
citizens come to tolerate each others’ private differences. Children, as future
citizens, develop these attachments best within the context of a public school
that models in miniature this national public square. Just as it is not enough for
adults to overcome the mutual mistrust and intolerance implied by radical
pluralism in the absence of a set of common spaces and institutions to which
they all feel connected and for which they feel mutually responsible, neither is
itsufﬁcientforchildrentodiscusstheprinciplesofliberaldemocracyabstractly
andfrompositionsofmutuallyexclusivedifference.Instead,Iwouldconclude,
apublicspaceorbodymustbecreatedinwhichchildrenparticipateincommon
and with which they identify. This aim is clearly not fulﬁlled by the English
model of schooling presented above.
Finally, in contrast to the ‘book-learning’ in civic virtue that children
experience in the ‘privatized’ public schooling represented by the English
model, I would suggest that children can practise the civic virtues and establish
them over time as habits of character only within a truly public school. As the
American educational reformer Theodore Sizer terms it (presumably following
Aristotle), the capacities for critical reﬂection, detachment and toleration are
dependentuponchildren’sdevelopingproperhabitswithinasuitably-designed
and structured community. ‘Habit grows from a mixture of conviction …, of
practice …, and of reinforcement from the community … It is the habit of
thoughtfulness, of bringing an informed, balanced, and responsibly skeptical
approach to life, that schooling addresses.’
25 The public school, under this
reading, should thus be intentionally constructed so as to provide a true model
in miniature of the body public, in which children interact and participate so as
to build the habits of civic virtue necessary for the long-term preservation of
liberal democracy.
TworesponsesarepossibletothissetofobjectionsagainsttheEnglishmodel
ofpoliticallyliberaleducationoutlinedabove.Onemightattempttorefuteeach
of the four objections, to prove that the divided, ‘privatized’ public education
representedbyEnglishschoolpolicyisindeedadequatetoteachthecivicvirtues
and habits of character necessary for democratic citizenship, and thus is
adequatetopreservethestructuresofliberaldemocracy.Sucharefutationmight
rely on broad theoretical and empirical arguments that apply to most states and
most children; it might also be made in reference to a smaller ﬁeld such as a
single state which is distinguished by certain unique characteristics. ‘In most
communities’, this latter argument would run, ‘the objections to separate
25 Theodore R. Sizer, Horace’s School: Redesigning the American High School (Boston, Mass.:
Houghton Mifﬂin, 1992), p. 69 (italics mine). On the subject and importance of habits, see also John
Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Random House, 1922), Part I; Aristotle,
Nichomachean Ethics, revised trans. J. Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984),
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culturally, linguistically, religiously or economically homogeneous public
schools are sound, but not in our community, for the following special reasons’
(whatever they might be). Cases in which the English model might be both
attractive and compatible with the principles of political liberalism will be
discussed in Section IV below.
Manyliberals,however,willnotﬁndthewholesalerejectionoftheobjections
outlined above to be adequate. A second response to the problem of politically
liberal education, therefore, is needed – one that engages more directly with the
issues that are involved, especially with the need to foster reasonable
detachmentfromone’sowncommitmentsandtoestablishtheschoolasapublic
space in which all children share and with which they all identify. I would
suggest that a partial solution to this problem can be found in the policy of
neutralityrepresentedbytheFrenchandAmericanschoolsystems.Asweshall
see below, both countries consciously establish the school as a public place by
adopting a policy of public non-identiﬁcation with private conceptions of the
good.Religion,forexample,isstrictlyexcludedfromthecurriculumandpublic
life of the school in both countries. Public schools are non-denominational;
prayerwithintheclassroom(andtheschoolassembly)isstrictlyforbidden;and
schoolofﬁcialsremainofﬁciallyneutralorsilentbothbetweenspeciﬁcreligions
and about religion in general.
26
Inthisway,eachstate’spolicyofneutralityservestomaintainastrictdivision
betweentheprivateandthepublicbyrefusingtoallowanypublicschooltotake
astandonorintentionallytobiasindividuals’privatecommitments.Atthesame
time, their neutrality permits children from all backgrounds to enter the school
as equals, and presumably to identify equally with the school as a shared
(becausenon-discriminatory)publicspace.
27TheFrenchandAmericansystems
26 Itmightbearguedthatreligionisaspecialcaseinbothcountries–intheUnitedStatesbecause
of the First Amendment of the US Constitution; in France for historical reasons stemming from the
French Revolution, anti-Catholicism and the ‘republican school’ ideal promulgated by Jules Ferry
in the 1870s. (See Mona Ozouf, L’E ´cole, l’E ´glise et la Re ´publique (Paris: E ´ditions Cana/Jean
Offredo, 1982); Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen (London: Chatto & Windus, 1979).) None
the less, both the United States and France pursue educational neutrality in relation to other cultural
practices, ‘lifestyle choices’ and community mores as well.
27 The assumption that neutrality can mean equality even in theory has, of course, been sharply
questioned for years by critics of liberalism and of liberal education. Stolzenberg is especially
suspicious of ‘neutral’ education (see fn. 1), contending that from the (reasonable) perspective of
fundamentalist Christian parents, schooling in the United States that is neutral among all religious
beliefs is patently unequal in relation to their own. In many ways the success of this anti-neutralist
argument directly entails the failure of the public square as a theoretical possibility: if neutrality can
nevertranslatetoequality,thenthepublicsquareasaspaceequallyopenandaccessibletoallcitizens
is also a theoretical (as well as practical) impossibility. In so far as this argument could very well
put the lie to political liberalism as a coherent theory, it is an essential one to consider. In an article
such as this, however, which attempts to apply the (presumably coherent) principles of political
liberalism as opposed to treating them as objects of study themselves, such criticisms fall beyond
the scope of the exercise. Thus, I shall not further address these criticisms explicitly – although they
willcontinuetobeexploredindirectly,especiallyinSection IIIonFrance,throughdiscussionofother
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thusseemtosatisfythepublic–privatedistinction,astheEnglishmodeldid,but
insuchawaythatalsorespondstopoliticalliberalism’sconcernthattheschool
maintain a public character in which to foster democratic education and the
development of civic virtue.
However, this surface similarity between the French and the American
approaches conceals an essential difference underlying their two ‘solutions’ to
the dilemma of political liberalism, as we shall see in the following pages.
Although each country does pursue public neutrality, the two models are
intriguingly and importantly distinguished by their contrasting means of
achieving this neutral public character – and by implication, their means of
achieving (and conceiving) their national civic identity. As I will show in
Sections II and III, these differences will have important implications for how
eachbalancesthetensionbetweenliberalismanddemocracy,aswellasforhow
eachincorporatespluralismintothepublicschoolandthepublicculture.Neither
model, however, will be seen fully to resolve the tensions between liberalism
anddemocracy;incertainways,infact,weaknessesinbothpositionswillbring
usbackfullcircletoaspectsoftheEnglishmodel.Theconclusionofthisarticle,
therefore, will address the absence of a single educational ‘solution’ to the
tensions inherent within political liberalism, and brieﬂy consider under what
conditions each of the three models might seem most attractive.
II. BUILDING A ‘MOSAIC’: AMERICAN EDUCATION AND POLITICAL
PLURALISM
One can achieve neutrality among a given set of competing claims (values,
commitments,conceptionsofthegood,etc.)intwoways.Onewayistoexclude
all claims from consideration; by ignoring them all, one shows preference
towards none. This ‘exclusionary’ approach is characteristic of the French
modelofpubliceducationandwillbediscussedinSection III.Asecondmethod
of achieving neutrality is to adopt a policy of equal inclusion instead of
exclusion. By somehow accommodating all conceptions of the good within the
purview of the school, one can at least in theory create an overall neutral
environment in which all people have an equal stake. This, I suggest, is the aim
of American education – to create a public school, a public space, and (even
moreambitiously)apublicnationalidentity,inwhichallprivateindividualsand
identities ﬁnd inclusion.
Two problems immediately present themselves in trying to accommodate
private difference within what is meant to be a shared public space. First, one
must answer how this approach distinguishes itself from the English model,
which also apparently attempted to accommodate private conceptions of the
good within the public sphere. The answer is that under the American model,
the inclusion of difference takes place on a local as opposed to (or as well as)
a national level. Every school, and not just society taken as a whole, is meant
to incorporate difference within its walls. As emphasized in Section I, the
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identify, nor fostered the exposure to diversity and personal detachment from
one’scommitmentsthatisnecessaryforthedevelopmentoftolerationandcivic
virtue. Because of the localization of difference within every school, the
American system is able in theory to do both.
28
Secondly, the attempt to accommodate the public school to a diversity of
private commitments without losing the public character of the school poses
both a logical and a practical challenge. If the ‘accommodation’ or ‘inclusion’
of the private within the public means that the public space must be shaped to
promote the competing demands of individuals’ private commitments and
values, then the enterprise seems doomed. It is impossible to express ‘A’ and
‘not-A’simultaneously;yet,giventheradicalpluralityofmodernindustrialized
societies like America, this is what shaping the public space to reﬂect indi-
viduals’ competing conceptions of the good would require. In addition, even if
the claims of reason were somehow met, there is a practical difﬁculty. One of
the primary aims behind modelling the public school after the public square is
to establish a shared space in which children from a plurality of backgrounds
feel equally welcomed, involved and committed. Only thus, it was suggested
at the end of Section I, can children learn toleration, mutual respect and
identiﬁcation with the civic community. If the public school starts promoting
all of the diverse and competing commitments held by its students (and their
families),however,thenmanystudentswillpresumablyfeelalienated,sincethe
schoolwillappeartoembracevalueswhichtheyandtheirfamiliesreject.Thus,
the inclusionary approach to public (educational) neutrality can succeed only
if the accommodation of competing viewpoints and values is able to be
distinguished from the promotion of them.
Onemightwellask,then,whatismeantbytheclaimthattheAmericanmodel
of school provision respects the public–private distinction even as it creates
through the school a public space that accommodates the private commitments
heldbychildrenandtheirfamilies.Iwouldsuggestthatunderthe(inmanyways
uniquely) American principle of accommodation, the public space of the
American public school is created out of the overlap of individuals’ private
spacesandinterests.Onbothastructuralandacurricularlevel,USschoolshave
arguably adopted (and are perpetuating) a conception of shared civic identity
and education that is built out of the interaction and accommodation of
individuals’ separate, private identities.
29
28 ThisisnottosaythatinpracticeAmericanschoolsarealwayspluralist.Becausepublicschools
depend on geographically-deﬁned catchment areas which are often highly segregated, many schools
exhibit much less diversity than they should or are intended to do. But, as in my description of the
English model, I am interested in the theoretical, rather than empirical, implications of American
public school provision.
29 Consider Horace Bushnell’s Discourse on Common Schools in 1853, for example: ‘This great
institution, too, of common schools, is not only a part of the state, but is imperiously wanted as such,
for the common training of so many classes and conditions of people. There needs to be some place
where, in early childhood, they may be brought together and made acquainted with each other; thus
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Instructuralterms,childrenandparentsoften‘bargain’withtheschooltoget
special treatment in light of religious, ethnic, linguistic or other cultural
differences.Althougheachschoolnominallyoffersthesamecurricularchoices,
activities and structure for all non special-needs students,
30 students are
frequently excused from lessons or other obligations as a result of their
conﬂictingprivatecommitmentsorbeliefs.Thus,stronglyreligiousstudentsare
excusedfromhealthclassonthegroundsthatitcontravenestheir(oroftentheir
parents’) religious or moral beliefs by teaching contraceptive techniques; they
may also be released from biology class if it presents evolution as fact without
giving equal time to ‘scientiﬁc creationism’. For similarly religious reasons,
children of Jehovah’s Witnesses are excused from the quintessentially public
activity of saluting the ﬂag (an exercise that takes place every morning in most
of America’s primary school classrooms) because they see it as idolatrous.
31
Andnon-Englishspeakersareaccordedtherightbysomestatestostudythefull
curriculumintheirnativelanguageifacriticalmassofsimilarstudentsispresent
in the school or school district.
In all of these cases, the public space of the school shapes and reshapes itself
to accommodate the private needs, desires and commitments of its students. In
order to keep up its public character (and thus to satisfy the political liberal
demands of teaching civic virtue within a context that respects the public–
private distinction), it must attract and retain in one place an often
overwhelmingly diverse set of students with an equally diverse set of
expectations, needs and demands. As a result, the American school arguably
tries to be (or become) all things to all people, all of the time. The challenge,
of course, is to keep up the masquerade. As I suggested above, if the school
obviouslyaccommodatesitselftosuchadiversityofprivateinterests,itrunsthe
risk of alienating its students and thus losing its status as a truly public space.
The public school under the American model, therefore, must take on a
(F’note continued)
to form friendships; to be exercised together on a common footing of ingenuous rivalry … Indeed,
no child can be said to be well trained, especially no male child, who has not met the people as they
are, above him or below, in the seatings, plays and studies of the common school. Without this he
canneverbeafullyqualiﬁedcitizen,orpreparedtoacthispartwiselyasacitizen.’Bushnellisequally
forceful a few pages on: ‘Indeed, I seriously doubt whether any system of popular government can
stand the shock, for any length of time, of that ﬁerce animosity, that is certain to be gendered, where
the children are trained up wholly in their classes, and never brought together to feel, understand,
appreciate and respect each other, on the common footing of merit and of native talent, in a common
school.’ (Horace Bushnell, ‘Common Schools: A Discourse on the Modiﬁcations Demanded by the
Roman Catholics’, in Rush Welter, ed., American Writings on Popular Education: The Nineteenth
Century (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971), pp. 182, 183.)
30 I say ‘nominally’ because the appearance of a single curriculum open to all often masks the
reality of a number of separate, mutually exclusive – sometimes even mutually hostile – curricula
in operation at any one school; for a provocative account of this process of curricular differentiation
and accommodation within American secondary schools as a whole, see Arthur G. Powell, Eleanor
FarrarandDavidK.Cohen,TheShoppingMallHighSchool:WinnersandLosersintheEducational
Marketplace (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifﬂin, 1985).
31 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 319 U.S. (1943).Liberalism Versus Democracy? 347
multiplicity of simultaneous identities, hoping both that each facet of its
‘personality’willattractsomesetofstudentsandfamilies(whomightotherwise
retreat to private or parochial schools), and that out of the overlap of these
identitiesasharedpublicspacewillbeachievedinwhichstudentswillconfront
sufﬁcient diversity and heterogeneity to come to embrace the virtues of
toleration, mutual respect, and critical reﬂection.
32
We see the same pattern of (re)constructing the public identity of the school
(and more generally, the civic identity of the American public square) in the
newly-developed ‘multicultural’ curricula in use in many US primary and
secondary schools. The self-conscious recognition of the private within the
public is especially notable in two elements of the modern curriculum: the
(re)presentation of American history not as a single linear process but as a
discontinuoushistoryofanumberofdifferenttypesof‘hyphenatedAmericans’
(African-Americans, European-Americans, Latina-Americans, etc.); and re-
latedtothis,thetranslationoftheclassroommetaphorofAmericaasa‘melting
pot’ to America as ‘mosaic’.
33 Both of these elements are notable, I suggest,
because they represent the abandonment of an older, assimilative ideal of the
public school and of public life, under which newcomers (children as well as
immigrants) were considered to become ‘true Americans’ only when they had
learned to share in a unitary civic identity adopted (and lived) by all. This older
vision played itself out in the classroom in the form of civics classes that
emphasized the ‘melting pot’ conception of American identity, citizenship
contests and ‘school pride’ activities (still represented by weekly ‘pep rallies’
in most secondary schools), and the daily ‘Pledge of Allegiance’ mentioned
32 This structural accommodation of the public school to the union of private demands possibly
givesinsight,aswell,intotheabsenceofanationaleducationpolicy,anationalcurriculumornational
examinationsintheUnitedStates.Since,Ihaveargued,thepublicschoolundertheAmericanmodel
is not a homogeneous entity imposed from above but is instead constructed from ‘below’ from the
multiplicity of individual identities, it makes sense that the public school is governed on a local as
opposed to national level.
33 Although the speciﬁc terms and characteristic expressions of contemporary multicultural
educationarerelativelynew,itshouldbenotedthatmulticulturaleducationitselfhasstronghistorical
antecedents.Oneexampleofthisisthe‘hyphenated’characterizationofAmerica.Asnolessaﬁgure
than John Dewey declared in 1916, ‘Such terms as Irish-American or Hebrew-American or
German-American are false terms, because they seem to assume something that is already in
existenceinAmerica,towhichtheotherfactorsmaybehitchedon.Thefactis,thegenuineAmerican,
the typical American, is himself a hyphenated character. It does not mean that he is part American
and that some foreign ingredient is in his makeup. He is no American plus Pole or German. But the
American is himself Pole German English French Spanish Italian Greek Irish Scandinavian
Bohemian Jew – and so on. The point is to see to it that the hyphen connects instead of separates,
And this means at least that our public schools shall teach each factor to respect every other, and
shall take pains to enlighten us all as to the great past contributions of every strain in our composite
make-up.’ (John Dewey, Speech to the (American) National Education Association (1916): quoted
inNathanGlazer,‘Multicultural“SchoolWars”Dateto1840s’,SacramentoBee,28November1993,
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above.
34 While such activities and curricular requirements seemed to fulﬁl the
democraticelementofpoliticalliberalism,theydidsoinawaythatviolatedthe
liberal public–private distinction.
In contrast, the new multicultural ideal expresses a potentially truer form of
political liberalism by replacing the goal of assimilation with that of toleration,
and the unitary with a plural conception of American identity. Students now
learnthatonlyoutofthepreservationofdifference,andofmutualrespectamong
differentindividualswithdifferenthistoriesandcommitments,canthe‘mosaic’
that constitutes ‘hyphenated-America’ be achieved. Schools’ growing recogni-
tion of difference also expresses itself in the increasing number of classes on
thesecondaryschoollevelthatconcentrateontheracial,ethnicand/orgendered
aspects of the American experience (to say nothing of the proliferation of such
classes, as well as full majors, in many American universities).
Thus, at the level both of curriculum and of school structure, the American
model of school provision can be seen as providing an explicit, self-conscious
response to the dilemma of political liberalism and political liberal education.
Byconstructingtheidentityandcurriculumofthepublicschooloutoftheunion
of students’ private identities and commitments, the American model appears
to achieve a balance between the public–private distinction and the demands of
civic virtue. This springs in part from a much more positive conception of
pluralism than we have yet seen. In contrast to the English model of ‘divided
pluralism’presentedinSection I,theAmericanconstructionofthepublicschool
and public identity embraces pluralism as a truly desirable, public good that
should be fostered and appreciated at both the national and personal level. By
‘celebrating’ and modelling itself after the pluralist, national public square, the
American public school establishes a neutral space into which all individuals
areequallywelcomed,andthusultimatelyachievesthepubliccharacterthatthe
English school lacks. These characteristics arguably equip it to meet the four
objections to the English model discussed at the end of Section I, and (at least
in theory) to inculcate toleration, mutual respect and civic identiﬁcation among
itsstudents.Likewise,theveryneutralitythatestablishesthepublic,democratic
character of the school also fulﬁls the liberal demand that the private be kept
free from public interference or manipulation. Students’ identiﬁcation with
certainprivatecommitmentsisrespectedandevenwelcomedintosomeaspects
of the public life of the school, but no set of commitments is actually endorsed
by the public school. The public character of the school is built out of, but is
distinct from, the private spheres of student life.
Within this ‘celebration’ of the American conception of pluralism and the
American model’s apparent solution to the dilemma of political liberalism,
however, lurk two potentially fatal weaknesses. Both stem from the incorpora-
34 ‘I pledge allegiance to the ﬂag of the United States of America and to the Republic for which
it stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.’ (Quoted from memory;
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tion of the public from the private. First, there is the risk that the ‘masquerade’
of realizing the private within the public will work too well. I suggested above
that in order to draw all students and families into the school, the American
model of the public school has to take on a number of simultaneous identities,
accommodating itself in a continual process of reconstruction to meet the
expectations of a diverse population. At the same time, however, the school
cannotdiversifycompletely.Itmustretainandevenemphasizeelementswhich
are common to all students, for as the end of Section I argued, it is only in
recognizing the common demands of civic identity and public life (as
represented by the school) that students will come to participate and to
acknowledge each other as equal partners in the democratic process. If under
the American model, therefore, the public school fails to establish clearly
enough its shared, public character, then private identiﬁcations and commit-
mentsmaycontinuetoholdprimarysway.Studentsandfamilieswouldidentify
with their vision of the school – but not with the public institution taken as a
whole. Such a scenario would in effect return us, whether wittingly or
unwittingly, to the English model of school provision. The only difference
would be that a number of effectively separate, homogeneous schools would
co-exist under one school roof in the American model, as opposed to being
divided up among separate school buildings as in the English model. Although
the proof of this claim falls outside the scope of this article, it could well be
arguedthatsuchadividedco-existencehasalreadyimplicitlytakenplacewithin
American public life, ﬁnding its political expression in the proliferation of
interest-group and identity-group politics and the increasing division of the
polis. If such a retreat from civic identiﬁcation and democratic virtue to local
identiﬁcation and interest politics is a necessary outcome of the celebration of
the private within public life – i.e., if the Balkanization that many would argue
describes American society and political life is a necessary outcome of the
accommodationismofAmericancultureandeducation–thenpoliticallyliberal
education on the American model seems doomed from the start.
This problem becomes even more pointed as we move to consider the other
risk posed by the American model of school provision – that the public face of
the school could, rather than being overpowered by, itself actually overpower
the integrity of individuals’ private commitments. Toleration and civic
identiﬁcation require for their development conscious (and conscientious)
reﬂection about one’s civic or public identity, and about one’s relationship to
others in the public sphere. By conceptualizing their private identity as part of
– even constitutive of – their public persona (as the American model leads
people to do), individuals implicate their private identities in the activities of
theirpublicselves.Thus,whenthepublicschoolencouragesastudenttoreﬂect
critically upon her civic responsibilities, for example, it requires that she also
reconsider the commitments of her private self. This seems patently to violate
the public–private distinction central to political liberalism. This is not to
suggestthatciviceducationcaneverbekeptfullyinthepublicsphere;asInoted
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itself requires that one has come to recognize the contingency of one’s private
commitments and to adopt a stance of public detachment from one’s private
values.
35But,thereisadifferencebetweencomingtorecognizethecontingency
of one’s private beliefs in order to learn to tolerate others – a virtue essential
to the preservation of liberal democracy – and subjecting one’s private beliefs
to wholesale analysis within the public sphere of the school.
I suggested above that the American approach may fail to surmount the
private divisions between people and thus fail to establish a truly democratic
education in civic virtue. If in this case we see that the same approach may also
fail adequately to preserve (observe?) the public–private distinction, the
American project seems doomed as an adequate response to the dilemma of
political liberalism. In sum, the American model’s delicate balancing act
between the claims of individual privacy and the common experience of
democratic education may fail adequately to satisfy either element of political
liberalism.Byforcingtheincorporationofeachindividual’sprivateidentityinto
thepublicsphere,theAmericanapproachmayviolatetheintegrityoftheprivate
sphereofchildren’sandfamilies’lives;italsorunstheriskoffosteringapublic
square characterized by civic instability and identity politics as opposed to
democratic virtue and civic identiﬁcation.
We must therefore seek out a third solution to the dilemma of a politically
liberal education – one that seeks to construct the public character of the school
attempted by the American model of school provision, yet manages to separate
individuals’ private commitments from the public body of the school in a
manner different from both the American and the English models. This third
‘solution’, I suggest, can be found in the French approach to school provision,
an approach to which Section III now turns.
III. SECULARISM AND CITIZENSHIP: THE FRENCH MODEL
The English and the American models left us with two important challenges.
First, in order to avoid the downfall of the English approach, the politically
liberal school system must establish schools as public spaces that are properly
representative of the public square. They must, as far as reasonably possible:
bring together a range of students representative of the national society; inspire
widespread communal identiﬁcation and attachment; and consciously and
conscientiously inculcate the habits of civic virtue including toleration, civic
identity and critical reﬂectiveness. These requirements have implications both
fortheoverallstructureofschoolprovision(forexample,publicschoolsshould
35 Peter Gardner gives the argument a strong twist: ‘In reply to the objection that cultivating
dispositional tolerance involves an unacceptable predetermination of character, we could point out
thatalleducationcanbeseeninthislight;tosayweshouldnotattempttoinﬂuencechildren’svalues
is to propose abandoning education.’ (Peter Gardner, ‘Tolerance and Education’, in John Horton,
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probably not be denominational or otherwise exclusionary) and for the
curriculum that gets taught – implications that for the most part the American
model picked up on. The very failure of the American model none the less to
achieve a politically liberal system of school provision, however, implicitly
conveys the second challenge: namely, that the public character of the school
must be achieved without sacriﬁcing a robust distinction between individuals’
public and private lives.
It is to these two challenges that the third, ‘French’ model of political liberal
education should be seen to respond. Like the American approach, this model
takes a commitment to neutrality as its starting point for constructing the public
space of the school and the public identity of its students and future citizens.
In contrast to the American model, however, the French neutral public school
is created not through a principle of equal accommodation of the private within
the public life of the school and the individual, but through a principle of equal
exclusion of the private from the public. Students (as well as all teachers and
school staff) are expected to shed their commitments at the school door in order
to enter as equals the ‘public square’ represented by the school. For example,
they are forbidden to wear ‘ostentatious’ symbols of religious afﬁliation,
36 to
claimexcusedschoolabsencesstemmingfromreligiousfestivalsorobligations,
andtoomitanyportionofthenationalcurriculumoncultural,religiousorother
private grounds. Students are treated as solely public beings from the moment
they enter the school gates.
Likewise,theschoolitselfispurgedofparticularisticcommitmentsinfavour
ofconstructingauniﬁed,nationalcharacter.Onastructurallevel,publicschools
are resolutely secular and similar, making few if any accommodations for local
orregionalvariationsinlanguage,cultureorethnicity,andnoaccommodations
for religious commitment.
37 All are bound to teach the national curriculum (as
are many private schools), and none may violate the (ostensibly) secular code
36 Franc ¸ois Bayrou, ‘Le texte du ministre de l’e ´ducation nationale’, Le Monde, 21 September
1994, p. 13. (Translated by Cathie Lloyd, and hereafter referred to as ‘Bayrou Circular’.)
37 It may well be objected at this point that my use of ‘public school’ is misleading, because even
though it is true that all state schools are secular, the French government none the less heavily
subsidizes the ‘private’ Roman Catholic school system. In so far as it partially funds a system of
separate, homogeneous schools, the French system might be seen as more analogous to the English
than to the American system, and consequently as far less neutral or democracy-advancing than I
have claimed. The situation is further complicated by the fact that Roman Catholic schools are the
only denominational schools that the French state will ﬁnancially support; Jewish, Muslim and even
Lutheran or Methodist schools have no rights to (and will be refused) governmental funding. I admit
thatthesefactsdothrowofftrackthemodelIhavebeendeveloping,aswellassubstantiallyreducing
itsusefulnessintheframeworkofthearticle.Asaresult,Icanonlyremindthereaderthatthepurview
of this article is restricted to (ofﬁcially) public schools, and that these national models should in the
endbetakenasjustthat–models.FormoreonrelationsbetweentheFrenchgovernmentandRoman
Catholic schools, see Ozouf, L’E ´cole, l’E ´glise et la Re ´publique.352 LEVINSON
bywhichitsscheduleisgoverned.Inthissensetheschoolisexplicitlyintended
to mirror the secular neutrality of the public square.
38
On the curricular level, too, anything which smacks of religious afﬁliation or
identitypoliticsisexcluded:religionclassesarebanned;Frenchhistoryistaught
in terms of supposedly universally apprehensible ideas and movements, as
opposed to in terms of the hyphenated histories of difference and individualism
favouredinAmericanclassrooms;regionallanguagessuchasBretonwereuntil
recentlynottaughtorspokeninpublicschools;and,mosttellinglyofall,French
educators and politicians explicitly acknowledge the aim of the curriculum to
teach students to be ‘French’. Although this nationalizing vision was ﬁrst
institutedbyFerry’s1870sschoolreforms,Franc ¸oisBayrou,educationminister
in the mid 1990s, gave what is probably one of the most striking recent
articulations of this aim, and is worth quoting at length:
In France the national and republican projects have been identiﬁed with a certain
idea of citizenship. This French idea of the nation and republic by nature respects
all convictions, particularly religious and political beliefs and cultural traditions.
But it rules out the breaking down of the nation into separate communities which
are indifferent to one another, and which respect only their own rules and laws and
only engage in a simple coexistence. The nation is not only a group of citizens who
hold individual rights. It is a community with a destiny.
This ideal is constructed ﬁrstly at school. School is the space which more than
any other involves education and integration where all children and all youth are
to be found, learning to live together and respect one another. If in this school there
aresignsofbehaviourwhichshowthattheycannotconformtothesameobligations,
orattendthesamecoursesandfollowthesameprogrammes,itnegatesthismission.
All discrimination should stop at the school gates, whether it is sexual, cultural, or
religious discrimination.
This secular and national ideal is the very substance of the Republican school
and the foundation of its duty of civic education.39
As this quotation potently suggests, the French model explicity commits itself
to the inculcation of democratic virtue and civic identiﬁcation within its
students, consciously shaping the ‘Republican’ public school to mirror and to
establish the uniﬁed and ‘destin[ed]’ character of the national square.
How does such an approach match the demands of political liberalism? I
would suggest that at least on the face of things, the French model of achieving
publicneutralitythroughprivateexclusionisabletobalanceboththeliberaland
the political (democratic) strands of political liberalism quite well. It preserves
38 This self-conscious link between the school and the nation is historically grounded in the very
foundingofpubliceducation.AsJulesFerry,thearchitectofthemodernFrenchpublicschoolsystem,
declared in a speech to the Chamber of Deputies in 1880: ‘Religious neutrality in the school…is,
in my eyes and the eyes of the Government, the consequence of the secularization of civil power
andofallsocialinstitutions.’(JulesFerry,‘Discoursa ` laChambredesDe ´pute ´s’,23December1880,
in Vive La Re ´publique 1792–1992 (Paris: Archives Nationales, 1992), p. 155 (my translation).)
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the public–private distinction by encouraging – forcing – the private to remain
fully separate from public life. By giving no public space or attention, be it
afﬁrmativeornegative,totheprivatedimensionofindividuals’lives,itarguably
preserves in a liberal fashion the integrity and distinctiveness of the private
sphere. At the same time, the exclusion of private differences from the public
sphere frees up the public space of the school – and the public identity of the
individual – to be shaped in service of democracy more fully than either the
American or the English models allowed. No longer is the public character of
the school constrained by private needs or demands; as a result, the school can
devote full attention (or whatever level of attention is appropriate) to achieving
the civic educational goals initially set out at the end of Section I and reiterated
at the beginning of this section.
It is worth noting that the aims of civic education are easier to achieve in this
setting,too,becausebyredeﬁningpeoplewhollyintermsoftheirpublicselves,
the French model shifts the brunt of democratic education from teaching
toleration of private others to inculcating mutual respect for public similars.
Civic virtue under this model does not require toleration of difference, because
people’s differences do not enter the public square. Instead, students are taught
to see and respect each other as equal, even undifferentiated, inhabitants of the
same public space and public character. The French model thereby completely
avoids the American trap of blurring the public and the private through
conveyingsubstantivemessagesaboutthevalueofothers’privatecommitments
(i.e.,thattheydeserverespect).Individuals’privateidentitiesandcommitments
simply do not enter the picture.
Despite its apparent success at integrating the liberal with the democratic
demands of political liberalism, however, the secular, exclusionary neutrality
thatmotivatestheFrenchmodelmaybeadouble-edgedsword.Threeobjections
to the French model present themselves in particular: that individuals’ private
differences are in practice swallowed up rather than protected by a homogeniz-
ing national public character; that the republican character of the French model
is anti-liberal; and that an exclusionary neutrality of the sort represented by the
French model must itself be non-neutral, and therefore incompatible with
politicalliberalism.Whileitispossibletopursuetheseobjectionsontheoretical
grounds alone, I will examine them through the lens of l’affaire du foulard –
a recent series of cases in which Muslim girls in France who started wearing
headscarvestopublicschooltouchedoffanationwidedebateaboutnationality,
immigration, minorities, education, the Republican tradition and the future of
France itself.
The initial incident is deceptively simple. In September 1989, three Muslim
schoolgirls wore the traditional Muslim headscarf, the hijab (misleadingly
translated as foulard in French), to class in the Parisian suburb of Creil. The
headmaster barred the girls from entering, citing a 1937 law prohibiting
religious symbols in school; he later offered to permit them to wear the scarf,
which covered their hair, ears and necks but not their faces, in the school yard
but not in class. A three-month standoff occurred, until ﬁnally two of the girls354 LEVINSON
declared they would remove the hijab in class and the fracas (temporarily)
subsided.
40 In the meantime, however, the incident had sparked a raucous and
hotly-contested national debate about the nature of religious neutrality in the
‘republican’ school. In November 1989, Prime Minister Michel Rocard took a
stand, declaring that ‘France could not be “a juxtaposition of communities”, it
could not follow the Anglo-Saxon models that allowed ethnic groups to live in
geographicandcultural“ghettoes”,andresultedin“softformsofapartheid.” ’
41
Later that spring, the Conseil d’E ´tat ruled on the case, taking the more lenient
view that each school had the right to set its own policy, with future incidents
being decided by local authorities and school ofﬁcials on a case-by-case basis.
Three years later in November 1993, l’affaire du foulard erupted again, this
timewithfourgirlsbeingsuspendedfromschoolinNantua.Inconjunctionwith
this action, the government deported a local Turkish imam who had declared
‘Allah’slawtakesprecedenceoverFrenchlaw,’andplacedanIslamic‘adviser’
to the girls’ family under house arrest.
42 In response, an estimated 700 Muslim
girls started wearing headscarves themselves, until at its peak, approximately
2,000 children (out of 150,000–250,000 Muslim girls attending French public
schools) were wearing the hijab to class.
43 Although this amounted to only 1
percentofMuslimgirlswhoattendedpublicschool,andlessthan0.02percent
of the French school-age population as a whole (estimated to number 12
million),
44itcausedmassivepublicandgovernmentaloutcry.On10September
1994, Bayrou announced that he was reversing the Conseil d’E ´tat’s decision,
and would ban headscarves from all public schools:
It is not possible to accept the presence and multiplication of ostentatious signs
in school whose signiﬁcation involves the separation of certain students from the
rules of the common life of the school. These signs are in themselves part of
proselytisation …
I would therefore ask you [heads of schools and teachers] to propose to your
administrative councils to include in your internal rules the banning of these
ostentatious signs while recalling that more discreet signs which indicate
40 There are many summaries of the initial incident. Some of the most informative include the
following: ‘Behind the yashmak’, The Economist, 28 October 1989, p. 68; ‘Muslim pupils will take
off scarves in class’, Los Angeles Times, 3 December 1989, p. A15; ‘Muslims object to school ban
on headscarves’, Independent, 15 January 1990, p. 6; Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, ‘Citizenship and
Equality: The Place for Toleration’, Political Theory, 21 (1993), 585–605; and Norma Claire
Moruzzi, ‘A Problem with Headscarves: Contemporary Complexities of Political and Social
Identity’,PoliticalTheory,22(1994),653–72.Aninterestingsummaryandinterpretationofl’affaire
to date can be found in ‘La saga des foulards’, Le Monde, 13 October 1994, p. v.
41 Moruzzi, ‘A Problem with Headscarves’, p. 68.
42 ‘France, reversing course, ﬁghts immigrants’ refusal to be French’, New York Times,5
December 1993, p. 1.
43 ‘France bans Muslim scarf in its schools’, New York Times, 11 September 1994, p. 4; ‘Chador
wear spurs battle in France’, Rocky Mountain News, 1 December 1994, Ed.F, p. 48A.
44 ‘Choice of school is state or Catholic’, Independent, 8 September 1993, p. 7.Liberalism Versus Democracy? 355
attachment to personal conviction should not be treated in the same way, as the
Conseil d’E ´tat and administrative jurisprudence have already stated …
I would also ask you to ask all teachers of all disciplines, all educational
personnel,andtherestofyourteamtoexplaintothepupilsintheirchargethedouble
meaning of respect for personal convictions and ﬁrmness in the defence of the
republican project in our country.45
This is where l’affaire du foulard now stands. Sixty-eight girls have been
suspended from school since the Bayrou directive; the number of girls wearing
the scarf dropped from 2,000 in September to 600 in December 1994; and the
principles of exclusionary neutrality in service of civic education have been
reasserted.
46
The outcome of l’affaire, I suggest, signals the failure of the third and ﬁnal
model for a politically liberal education that effectively balances the liberal
principle of respecting individuals’ private commitments with the democratic
principle of inculcating civic virtue in future citizens. Let us return to the three
objections to the French model enumerated above. First, I would argue that the
wholesale exclusion of students’ private commitments and beliefs from the
public sphere of the classroom can result in those students’ private identities
being swallowed up and replaced by the homogenizing norms and identity of
public life.
47 This seems to be the aim of French schooling, in so far as
educational and political ofﬁcials across the political spectrum in France speak
with horror of a pluralistic, multicultural society along American lines. To
support an ‘American’ right to difference, former Socialist Minister of
Education Jean-Pierre Chevenement warned, would be to prepare France for ‘a
45 ‘Bayrou Circular’.
46 ‘Chador wear spurs battle in France’, p. 48A. The story has actually become more complicated
again since April 1995, when ﬁrst a court in Lille, and then the Conseil d’E ´tat, decided that wearing
a headscarf was not ‘in itself’ necessarily ostentatious and proselytizing. It is as yet unclear what
effect these judgements will have on schools’ enforcement of the ‘Bayrou Circular’, since the lack
of a clear, uniﬁed government position leaves schools in an uncertain position. Presumably some
headmasters will seize the leeway given by the Conseil d’E ´tat decision and permit Muslim girls to
wear headscarves in school, while others will continue to expel those girls who insist on covering
themselves.Regardlessofhowteachersandschoolsrespond‘ontheground’,however,theprinciple
banning ostentatious and proselytizing symbols still stands unchallenged. See ‘Le Conseil d’E ´tat
tole `re sous conditions l’absence scolaire le jour du shabbat’, Le Monde, 16–17 April 1995, p. 9; ‘Le
tribunal de Strasbourg annule l’exclusion de dix-huit jeunes ﬁlles voile ´es’, Le Monde, 5 May 1995,
p. 12.
47 ‘Within republican thought, the political and cultural communities are made interchangeable;
national political membership implies acceptance of French cultural values and principles.’ (Miriam
Feldblum, ‘Paradoxes of Ethnic Politics: The Case of Franco-Maghrebis in France’, Ethnic and
Racial Studies, 16 (1993), 52–74, p. 55.) See also Rogers Brubacker, Citizenship and Nationhood
in France and Germany (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), in which he agrees
that: ‘By inventing the national citizen and the legally homogeneous national citizenry, the
Revolution simultaneously invented the foreigner. Henceforth citizen and foreigner would be
correlative, mutually exclusive, exhaustive categories’ (p. 46).356 LEVINSON
Lebanon’.
48 Bayrou speaks of the need to ‘build a united, secular society,
speciﬁcally where schools [are] concerned,’
49 while conservative deputy Pierre
Lellouche starkly declares, ‘Multiculturalism would be the end of France. You
can be what you want to be here – Christian, Jewish or Muslim – but we’re all
Gauls. The alternative is to create cultural ghettos’.
50 For the French, at least,
theexclusionoftheprivatefromthepublicspaceoftheclassroomdoesnotonly
have the possible and unintentional outcome of the withering up of individual
identity, but has such a loss as an explicit aim.
Is such an anti-pluralistic and ultimately illiberal stance the only possible
outcome of the French model? Might it not be possible in theory to separate the
constructive, exclusionary neutrality of the French approach from its more
sinister(thatis,lessliberal)outcomesintheempiricalsphereofFrenchpolitics?
In one sense these are impossible questions to answer, or at least to answer
quickly; they share the historical and empirical complexities inherent in the
question about American identity politics and fragmentation posed at the end
of Section II. But in another sense, the answer seems fairly clear: liberal respect
for and protection of private difference cannot coexist with the wholesale
exclusion of private difference from the public sphere, especially the sphere of
the public school. This is true for two reasons. On the one hand, it is difﬁcult
to separate the two strands of one’s identity in the way one would have to do
in order to preserve the pretence of ‘keeping the government out’ of one’s
private life (and thus fulﬁl the principles of political liberalism) – it seems
well-nigh impossible for children to effect such a separation. The relationships
children develop at school are often the sole relationships they have outside of
the family, and are consequently central to their personal, intellectual and
emotional development. It is simply bizarre to think that a Muslim girl could
form friendships at school based on a fully secularized, public identity and yet
maintain a fully intact and encumbered Muslim identity at home and in her
private life. On the other hand, private differences are often based on
identiﬁcation with and obedience to the laws of a particular collectivity, such
as the Muslim community. The restriction of difference to the private sphere
thus requires that individuals violate the religious or other laws to which they
havecommittedthemselveswhenevertheyenterthepublicsphereoftheschool.
In this respect, children’s private commitments as expressed through
identiﬁcation with non-public associations are effectively negated within the
walls of the public school.
The second objection to the French approach, that its republican character is
ultimately anti-liberal because it desiccates the private sphere, is also implied
by the model’s rejection of pluralism, of individuals’ collective identiﬁcation
48 Quoted in Moruzzi, ‘A Problem with Headscarves’, p. 65.
49 ‘France bans Muslim scarf in its schools’, p. 4.
50 Pierre Lellouche, quoted in ‘France, reversing course, ﬁghts immigrants’ refusal to be
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with non-public communities. Whether or not it is psychologically possible for
individuals, including children, to maintain mutually separate or disengaged
public and private identities, I suggest that the state under this model cannot
remain indifferent to individuals’ private commitments, as is required by
political liberalism. As the state’s conception of what civic virtue demands
increases,thespaceleftoverforindividuals’privatelivesnecessarilydecreases
– and decreases substantially. The public–private distinction may nominally be
preserved, but the range of private commitments that are seen not to interfere
with the public sphere is shrunk almost to obscurity. Thus, the girls’
‘ostentatious’ identiﬁcation with Islam through wearing the headscarf was
interpreted in France not only as illegitimate ‘proselytization’ to other students
which violated those students’ rights as public citizens, but also as: the
encroachment of fundamentalist Muslim terrorism on the French state;
51 an
anti-democraticandanti-egalitariansubjugationofwomenthathadthepotential
to reduce the girls’ own empowerment as citizens;
52 and the anti-republican
‘ghetto-ization’ of French society. People from the political left as well as the
right argued to ban the hijab in school on all of these grounds – all of which,
notice,areovertlyspunintermsofthepublicrightsanddutiesofcitizens.While
such reasons ostensibly make no claims upon the private sphere of individuals’
lives, I would argue that they depend on such a thick notion of the state and of
civic virtue as to be incompatible with political liberalism.
Finally,Iwouldalsosuggestthat‘neutralitybyexclusion’,whichconstitutes
the foundation of the French model, is itself non-neutral and therefore illiberal.
In order to exclude a private conception of the good such as religion from the
schools, someone must decide what is to count as religious display or practice
– and, correlatively, what is to count as non-religious display or practice (that
is, as religiously insigniﬁcant or irrelevant). This requires the adoption of a
public norm from which religious practice is seen to diverge. The problem is
thatitisimpossibletoconceiveofanormwhichitselfisnotreligiouslycharged.
ConsiderBayrou’sdistinctionbetween‘ostentatious’and‘discreet’symbolsof
religious afﬁliation. A symbol of religious afﬁliation is ostentatious by
deﬁnitiononlyifitdepartssubstantiallyfromthenorm.Bybanningostentatious
symbolsfromtheschoolyetpermittingsubdueddisplaysofreligiousafﬁliation
or belief, Bayrou is in effect identifying the public space of the school with the
prevailing religious norm. In practice, this means that Muslim headscarves are
excluded as ostentatious, while cruciﬁxes are ofﬁcially deemed to be discreet.
Such a distinction hardly seems compatible with the ideal and maintenance of
the secular school! The religious norm of the community, in this case
Christianity, is thus implicitly embraced by the supposedly secular school, and
Christianity comes ultimately to deﬁne the boundaries of the public square.
51 See ‘La saga des foulards’, p. v.
52 See Laurent Joffrin’s interview with Elisabeth Badinter, Le Nouvel Observateur, 9–15
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It is worth noting that this conclusion holds even if ‘discreet’ symbols were
banned from school, as becomes clear if we turn even cursory attention to the
rules, structure and schedule of French public schools. For example, French
schools forbid the wearing of hats or other head coverings inside the school
building, but this ban is interpretable as ‘secular’ only within the context of a
Christian society. For Jews and Muslims, going bareheaded is as much a mark
of (Christian) religious afﬁliation as covering one’s head is seen by Christians
to be a mark of (Jewish or Muslim) religious afﬁliation. The same is true for
the attendance schedule in French schools. As Norma Moruzzi reminds us, ‘the
French school week runs through part of Saturday, and the only full day of rest
ontheweekendisSunday.Thatpracticeisahappycompromiseofthereligious
and the secular, unless your religion is other than Christian, in which case the
secular school week may seem very much religiously deﬁned.’
53 Regardless of
the exclusion of ‘discreet’ versus ‘ostentatious’ religious symbols, therefore,
religion can never be fully excluded from the construction of the public school
(or the public square). In this case, at least, exclusionary neutrality is a
contradiction in terms.
54
In sum, I suggest that while the French model ostensibly attempts to achieve
the same aim as the American model does – namely, to balance equally the
demands of citizenship and the necessity of preserving the public–private
distinction – it does so in a way that ends up ransoming the private dimension
of individuals’ lives to the public demands of civic identiﬁcation and virtue. In
so far as the ‘cosmetic’ exclusion of private difference from the public school
(that is, excluding overt symbols of religious commitment) is buttressed by an
explicitly assimilationist (and thus anti-pluralistic) curriculum that attempts to
turn all children into ‘French(wo)men’,
55 the French approach effectively
sacriﬁces liberalism to democracy and political liberalism to the republican
ideal.
53 Moruzzi, ‘A Problem with Headscarves’, p. 664.
54 This conclusion rings especially true since the Conseil d’E ´tat’s decision on 14 April 1995 to
permit Jewish students to miss Saturday classes, under certain conditions, in order to observe the
Sabbath. So long as it neither impedes the students’ studies nor interferes with the life and public
orderoftheschool,headmastersmay,attheirowndiscretion,releaseobservantJewishstudentsfrom
Saturday classes. Although the Conseil d’E ´tat’s decision was accompanied by a companion
judgement that Muslim headscarves are not necessarily ‘in themselves’ ostentatious, it none the less
raises the question of whether it is really the principle of la laı ¨cite ´ that remains at work in French
education, or if it is more truthfully (and condemnably) anti-Muslim sentiment and fear that drives
French public schooling. As one 14 year-old Jewish student comments in this regard, ‘Of course I
am in favour of permitting [Jewish students to take Saturdays off] when possible. But it is hard to
swallow allowing Jews to skip Saturdays when Muslim girls are forbidden to wear the foulard.’
(‘ “Dieupardonne,l’examennepardonnepas” ’,LeMonde,16–17April1995,p.9(mytranslation).)
Seealso‘LeConseild’E ´tatautorisesousconditionsl’absencescolairelejourdushabbat’,LeMonde,
16–17 April 1995, pp. 1 and 9.
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IV CONCLUSION
In searching for a response to the defects of the French model, we might return,
full circle, to England – to an ideal of a politically liberal education that neither
tries (pretends) to achieve neutrality within the space of a single school, nor
attempts to shape individuals’ private selves and commitments to ﬁt the public
mould of civic obligation. But, of course, recovering the English model is not
a solution, for the original problems that drove us to develop the American and
French models in the ﬁrst place still remain – namely, its lack of attention to
democratic education, and its indifference to establishing a truly public space
in which pluralism and toleration could ﬂourish. Liberalism and democracy
werenobetterbalancedbytheEnglishsystemofprivatizedpublicschoolsthan
they are by a French system that ‘publicizes’ private selves, or for that matter,
thanbyanaccommodationistAmericansysteminwhichindividuals’publicand
privateidentitiesnestleuneasilyinsideeachotherlikeRussianmatrioshkadolls.
Eachofthethreemodelshasstrengthsthattheothertwolack.Buteachalsohas
weaknesses that make it unﬁt as a universal template for politically liberal
education.
What does this mean for political liberalism, and for the fate of politically
liberal education and societies? For political liberalism itself, it means that its
liberal and democratic commitments are possibly irreconcilable on a practical
level,andthereforethatthetheoryissubjecttoanirremediableinternaltension.
This tension may or may not be productive. But, it does raise some important
questions about political liberalism’s claim to superior legitimacy and stability
within modem political theory. As I noted at the very beginning of Section I,
political liberalism is often justiﬁed by reference to its supposedly wide appeal
among plural groups in society, and thus its superior legitimacy as a stable
foundation for the liberal polity. If, however, because of its inability to balance
its liberal and democratic ideals, politically liberal education can neither create
nor sustain a balanced, viable liberal democracy, then its superiority to other
political doctrines is cast into doubt and demands reanalysis.
The outcome for education is also complicated. Because of the complexity
of the relationships that we have seen between liberalism, democracy, national
culture, pluralism and education, I would suggest that at this point a heavy dose
ofmessyempiricismcomesintoplay.Althoughnomodelperfectlyachievesthe
politically liberal ideal (in theory, let alone in practice!), each one may be
appropriate for particular circumstances. The French model may make sense in
a historically fractured or Balkanized society, where individuals’ private
commitments completely deﬁne their public roles, and where mutual intoler-
ance of private difference might be overcome only through an approach which
sets aside all private beliefs as irrelevant to the public sphere. The English
model,bycontrast,maybeappropriatetoasocietyinwhichprivatebeliefshave
becomestuntedandlost.Ratherthanemphasizepointsofcommonalitybetween
people, such a society might need to buttress the efforts of individual families
to educate their children in determinate and rich conceptions of the good. Many360 LEVINSON
right-leaning thinkers in the United States, in fact, have begun to suggest the
necessity for such an approach in America, as they see the ultimately
dehumanizingcultureofconsumerismandlaissez-fairemoralitytakingoverthe
nation’s youth. Finally, the American model too has its place, although it is
difﬁcult to characterize quite so simply what such societies look like. As the
approachwhichmostconsciously(andconscientiously)triestobalancethetwo
spheresofpoliticalliberalism,theAmericanmodelisarguablymostﬂexibleand
appropriate for the greatest number of pluralistic, multicultural communities. If
itsinevitableoutcome,however,istheseparatismandidentitypoliticsdiscussed
at the end of Section II, then it may ultimately be unsuitable for any national
community – the United States included.
Ideally, a hybrid model might be sought, one that bridges the strengths of all
threeapproaches,butitisdifﬁculttoengineeronethatwillnotendupcollapsing
into one of the three ‘purer’ types presented above. One of the most plausible
hybrids,inthissense,isamodelthatrecognizescertainaxesofself-segregation
as permissible while refusing to permit other, more threatening types. James
Coleman points out that in the United States, ‘Catholic schools are less racially
and economically segregated than are US public schools; this suggests that,
when a school is deﬁned around and controlled by a religious community,
families may tolerate more racial and economic heterogeneity than they would
in a school deﬁned around a residential area and controlled by government
ofﬁcials.’
56Stateencouragementofcertaintypesofinnocuousgroupingamong
families,alongthelinesoftheEnglishmodel,couldthusplausiblyensureamore
common and diversiﬁed school experience overall; racial and economic
diversity, in this case, are tolerated for the sake of religious homogeneity.
As Coleman’s study itself demonstrates, however, these patterns of self-
segregation and diversiﬁcation are highly local and pragmatic in character.
Theoreticalmodelscanexertlimitedsway,atbest,ontheempiricaljudgements
necessary for this stage of educational implementation.
Ultimately, therefore, this article ends on a questioning note. While the
American approach to school provision may best address the balance between
liberalism and democracy, no single model satisﬁes – in theory or in practice
– all of the demands set forth by political liberalism. It is probable that each
institutionalapproachmaysatisfycertainsocieties’needsandnotothers.There
is no catch-all solution, however, to the problem of political liberalism, nor
especiallytotheproblemofinstitutingapoliticallyliberaleducationinanoften
illiberal world. The education of citizens continues to be a messy business – a
messiness that liberal theory would be foolish to ignore.
56 James S. Coleman, Equality and Achievement in Education (London: Westview Press, 1990),
p. 243.